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I. Introduction 
This article summarizes and discusses important developments in 
Wyoming’s oil and gas law between August 1, 2018 and July 31, 2019. 
During this time period, the Wyoming legislature passed a bill into law 
concerning the priority of county ad valorem tax liens on mineral 
production.1 The Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission 
(“WOGCC”) issued new policies concerning the movement of a horizontal 
well location after the related well drilling permit has been approved and the 
protests of applications for permits to drill.  
Also during this applicable time period, there were cases of note which 
dealt with the application of forum-selection clauses in oil and gas lease 
purchase and sale agreements, and whether the Bureau of Land Management 
(the “BLM”) was an indispensable party in litigation over the conflict 
between private oil and gas leases and coal development under federal 
government leases. 
II. Legislation 
A. Priority of Tax Lien on Mineral Production 
Senate File 0118, signed into law on March 8, 2019, amended various 
subparts of Wyoming Statute 39-13-108(d) to provide that, on or after 
January 1, 2021, a county ad valorem tax lien on mineral production is 
perpetual against all persons except the United States and the State of 
Wyoming, is perfected immediately upon production of the minerals subject 
to all prior existing liens (presumably liens of the same type, although the 
provision does not specify), is superior and paramount to all other liens, 
claims, mortgages, or other encumbrances (other than the claims specified in 
the previous exception), and shall survive any foreclosure actions until the 
taxes owed are paid in full or the tax lien is waived by the tax lien holder.2  
                                                                                                                 
 1. S. File 0118, 65th Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2019).  
 2. Id. 
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During the transitional eighteen month period July 1, 2019 through 
December 31, 2020, the tax lien is superior to all other liens unless the county 
fails by certain deadlines both to provide notice of the delinquent taxes to any 
bona fide creditor who holds a properly perfected, filed or recorded lien that 
the creditor also provided to the county treasurer, and to file its lien with the 
county clerk and recorder of real estate records and with the Wyoming 
Secretary of State.3  
The law further provides that a notice of tax lien is not required to be filed 
with the Wyoming Secretary of State in order to perfect, enforce, or foreclose 
a county tax lien on mineral production.4 
III. State Regulation 
A. New Guidance on Well Location Moves 
On February 9, 2019, the Supervisor of the Wyoming Oil and Gas 
Conservation Commission (“WOGCC”) issued new guidance concerning the 
movement of a horizontal well’s location after the well’s Application for 
Permit to Drill (“APD”) has been approved.5 As long as the planned location 
of the well’s horizontal lateral is moved within the same drilling and spacing 
unit, and the new location still complies with setbacks and authorizing orders 
of the WOGCC, no new APD submission and related notice is required.6 In 
those circumstances, only a sundry notice of the location change is required.7 
However, certain other changes, such as a change in the well’s target 
formation, require a new APD submission.8 Application of this new guidance 
is within the discretion of the WOGCC engineers reviewing APDs.9 
B. New Policy on Protests of Applications for Permit to Drill 
Building upon a policy issued July 11, 2017, a second WOGCC policy 
regarding protests of APDs was issued on May 13, 2019.10 Due to the large 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Well Location Move Requires Post APD Approval, WYO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION 
COMM’N, (Feb. 8, 2019), https://docs.google.com/a/wyo.gov/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid= 
d3lvLmdvdnxvaWwtYW5kLWdhc3xneDoyZmU3MTI0ZTY4ZmY1ZDky. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. 2nd Protest Policy for Applications for Permit to Drill (APD), WYO. OIL & GAS 
CONSERVATION COMM’N, (May 13, 2019), https://docs.google.com/a/wyo.gov/viewer?a=v& 
pid=sites&srcid=d3lvLmdvdnxvaWwtYW5kLWdhc3xneDo2YWJlZTgwZTI2YzVmNzM5. 
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number of protests of APDs that continue to be filed, all protests of APDs 
are to be immediately placed on the WOGCC’s inactive, “B” docket for an 
indefinite period.11 Later actions in the matter are either the withdrawal of 
the protest, the withdrawal or expiration of the APD, or a request by either 
party that the matter come off the “B” docket and be set for contested hearing 
before the WOGCC commissioners.  
C. Jurisdiction over Intrastate Refined Petroleum Products Pipelines  
On August 16, 2018, the Wyoming Public Service Commission (the 
“WPSC”) issued an order in a consolidated proceeding in which the WPSC 
decided whether it had the jurisdiction to regulate intrastate pipelines 
carrying refined petroleum products.12 Specifically, whether the term “oil” in 
the Wyoming Public Utilities Act at Wyo. Stat. § 37-1-101(a)(vi)(G) includes 
refined petroleum products such as gasoline, giving the WPSC jurisdiction 
over the intrastate transportation of these products by pipeline.13 
The WPSC had previously issued a clarification letter to Phillips 66 
Pipeline LLC (“Phillips 66”) (one of the applicants in the consolidated 
proceeding), in which the WPSC advised Phillips 66 that the WPSC did not 
have the jurisdiction to regulate intrastate pipelines carrying refined 
petroleum products, such as gasoline, and that Philips 66 should petition the 
WPSC for cancelation of tariffs relating to such pipelines.14  That letter 
prompted Phillips 66 to apply to the WPSC for cancelation of two existing 
WPSC-approved tariffs on intrastate refined petroleum products pipelines, 
and the WPSC canceled the tariffs.15 Subsequently Sinclair Oil Corporation 
(“Sinclair”), a refiner who has the physical capability to ship refined 
petroleum products between its refineries using one of Phillips 66’s intrastate 
pipelines, filed to intervene and requested a rehearing on the matter.16 
Separately, Pioneer Pipe Line Company (“Pioneer”) also applied for 
cancelation of its tariff on its intrastate refined petroleum products pipeline, 
and Sinclair filed to intervene and object in that matter as well.17  The WPSC 
consolidated the two matters.18 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Id. 
 12. In re Application of Phillips 66 Pipeline LLC; In re Application of Pioneer Pipe Line 
Company, 2018 WL 4052419 (Wyo. P.S.C. August 16, 2018). 
 13. Id. at *1. 
 14. Id. at *2. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id. at *2–3. 
 18. Id. at *3. 
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The WPSC first examined whether the term “oil” was ambiguous, as used 
in the Public Utilities Act, and found that it was.19  Next, the WPSC 
conducted statutory interpretation, by examining the legislative intent in 
enacting the statute in question in 1915, and then checking for any 
intervening legislative action between 1915 and the present day which would 
have changed the original legislative intent.20 The WPSC found that there 
was an intent to consider the transportation of “crude oil” and “refined 
products” similarly.21 Therefore the term “oil” in the Public Utilities Act 
included refined petroleum products, and the WPSC found it had the 
jurisdiction over the intrastate transportation by pipeline of refined petroleum 
products, including gasoline.22  The prior order granting cancelation of 
Phillips 66’s tariffs was reversed, and Pioneer’s application to cancel its tariff 
was denied.23 
IV. Judicial Developments 
A. Supreme Court of Wyoming 
1. Application of Forum-Selection Clause 
The dispute in Finley Resources, Inc. v. EP Energy E&P Company, L.P. 
arose from a Purchase and Sale Agreement (the “PSA”) executed between 
the parties for the sale of oil and gas leases located in Converse and Niobrara 
Counties, Wyoming.24 Finley Resources, Inc. (“Finley”) filed suit against EP 
Energy E&P Company, L.P. (“EP Energy”), seeking to quiet title into Finley 
of certain leases, declaratory judgment, claiming adverse possession, and 
also claiming breach of the PSA and breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing.25 At issue upon EP Energy’s motion to dismiss was whether the 
non-contract claims arose from or implicated the PSA, such that the forum-
selection clause in the PSA would operate and require the suit to be filed in 
Texas.26 After the state district court found that the forum-selection clause in 
the PSA did operate to require Finley to file its case in Texas, the court 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Id. at *8. 
 20. Id. at *8–12. 
 21. Id. at *10. 
 22. Id. at *13. 
 23. Id.  
 24. Finley Res., Inc. v. EP Energy E&P Co., L.P., 2019 WY 65, 443 P.3d 838 (Wyo. 
2019). 
 25. Id. ¶ 4, 443 P.3d at 841. 
 26. Id. ¶ 2, 443 P.3d at 841. 
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dismissed the case, and Finley appealed.27 The Supreme Court of Wyoming 
affirmed the district court’s ruling.28 
The PSA contained a forum-selection clause that required any suit arising 
out of the PSA to be brought in either United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas or any Texas state court sitting in Houston, “so 
long as one of such courts shall have subject matter jurisdiction over such 
suit.”29  
Finley asserted two main arguments upon appeal:  that the declaratory 
judgment, quiet title, and adverse possession claims did not arise from the 
PSA, and if they did, Texas courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider 
the claims.30 In its analysis, the court (applying Texas law per the governing 
law provision of the PSA) relied heavily on Pinto Tech. Ventures, L.P. v. 
Sheldon, 526 S.W.3d 428 (Tex. 2017).31 The Pinto court stated a “forum-
selection clause should be denied force only if the facts alleged in support of 
the claim stand alone, are completely independent of the contract, and the 
claim could be maintained without reference to the contract.”32 The court 
further elaborated that Pinto used a “but-for test,” examining whether but for 
the agreement in question, the plaintiff would have no basis to complain.33 
The court found that all three of Finley’s non-contract claims stemmed from 
the PSA and the transaction thereunder, so that all three claims are subject to 
the forum-selection clause.34  
The court then examined the subject matter qualification in the forum-
selection clause.35  The court stated that it is undisputed Texas courts have 
no subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate title to real property, including oil 
and gas leases, in another state or country, and also that a forum selection 
clause cannot “confer subject matter jurisdiction where it does not otherwise 
exist.”36 However, the court found that the strong legal precedent to uphold 
the terms of a private contract, combined with precedent that Texas courts 
need only have subject matter jurisdiction generally over the lawsuit rather 
than over every conceivable claim that may be brought relating to the 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Id. ¶ 1, 443 P.3d at 841. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. ¶ 5, 443 P.3d at 841. 
 30. Id. ¶ 8, 443 P.3d at 842. 
 31. Id. ¶ 11, 443 P.3d at 842–43. 
 32. Id. (quoting Pinto Tech. Ventures, L.P. v. Sheldon, 526 S.W. 428 (Tex. 2017)). 
 33. Id. ¶ 14, 443 P.3d at 843. 
 34. Id. ¶ 15, 443 P.3d at 843. 
 35. Id. ¶ 17, 443 P.3d at 844–45. 
 36. Id.  
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contract, caused the court to find the forum-selection clause of the PSA did 
operate with regard to Finley’s non-contract claims.37  
Finally, Finley attempted to argue that Wyoming has a strong public 
policy in determining title to the real property located within its boundaries; 
however, Finley offered no support for that statement.38 The court then cited 
precedent that required courts not lightly to interfere with the freedom of 
contract, in order to deny Finley’s public policy argument.39  
2. Whether the BLM is an Indispensable Party in a State Court Action 
regarding a Private-Federal Lease Dispute  
The 2018 volume of this journal summarized the proceedings in 
Berenergy Corp. v. BTU W. Res., Inc., 2018 WY 2, 408 P.3d 396 (Wyo. 
2018). Those proceedings are referred to as “Berenergy I.” The case 
concerned a dispute between mineral developers over a conflict between 
future oil and gas development versus future coal development on the same 
lands, each development to occur pursuant to federal leases issued by the 
BLM, and eventually led to the Wyoming Supreme Court addressing the key 
issue of whether the BLM was an indispensable party to the case, without 
which party the case must be dismissed.40  
In its Berenergy I decision, the court found the BLM to be an indispensable 
party in the case.41 Accordingly, the court remanded the case for an 
evaluation of whether the BLM (a federal agency) could be joined as a party, 
and if it could not, the case was to be dismissed.42   
In addition to the federal oil and gas leases held by Berenergy Corp. 
(“Berenergy”) that overlapped with the federal coal leases held by affiliates 
of Peabody Energy Corporation (collectively “Peabody”), Berenergy was the 
lessee on a private oil and gas lease (the “Thornburg Lease”) that also 
overlapped the lands of Peabody’s coal leases.43 After Berenergy I was 
decided in January 2018, Peabody petitioned for a rehearing on the basis that 
similar issues concerning the Thornburg Lease had not been included in the 
prior appeal; however the Wyoming Supreme Court declined to amend is 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id. ¶ 20, 443 P.3d at 845. 
 38. Id. ¶ 24, 443 P.3d at 846–47. 
 39. Id. 
 40. BTU W. Res., Inc. v. Berenergy Corp., 2019 WY 57, ¶¶ 6–8, 442 P.3d 50, 53 (Wyo. 
2019) 
 41. Id. ¶ 8, 442 P.3d at 53. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. at ¶ 1, 442 P.3d at 52. 
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decision in Berenergy I because of the very fact that the Thornburg Lease 
issues had not been properly appealed.44  
Upon remand to the district court to hear matters concerning the 
Thornburg Lease (these proceedings being “Berenergy II,” that court held it 
did not have subject matter jurisdiction as to the Thornburg Lease without 
the presence of the BLM in the case.45 The court went on to say that if it had 
jurisdiction, it would have applied the “accommodation doctrine” to resolve 
the parties’ dispute on overlapping mineral development.46 Both parties 
appealed.47 
The Wyoming Supreme Court stated that the issues before it in Berenergy 
II were (1) whether “the BLM’s participation necessary to resolve the 
Thornburg lease dispute,” and (2) whether the “‘law of the case’ doctrine 
require[s] the district court to apply its original judgment of 
accommodation[.]”48 
The court started by correcting the district court as to subject matter 
jurisdiction and what precisely the decision in Berenergy I was.49  The 
Berenergy I holding concerned the joinder of an indispensable party (a non-
jurisdictional question), not whether the district court had subject matter 
jurisdiction over the federal lease disputes.50 The court goes on to cite 
precedent that “makes clear that Wyoming courts have jurisdiction over 
mineral disputes between private parties, even where federal leases may be 
concerned.”51  
As to the issue of joinder of the BLM as an indispensable party, the court 
found that since the Thornburg Lease was a private lease, and the lease did 
not expressly vest the BLM with any discretion over the lease operational 
rights vis-à-vis competing federal leases, the BLM’s participation in the lease 
dispute was not required.52  The facts of Berenergy II were distinguishable 
from those in Berenergy I, where there were no independent private rights 
involved in the competing lease analysis.53 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Id. at ¶ 2, 442 P.3d at 52. 
 45. Id. at ¶ 3, 442 P.3d at 52. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at ¶ 4, 442 P.3d at 52. 
 49. Id. at ¶ 13, 442 P.3d at 54. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. ¶ 17, 442 P.3d at 56. 
 53. Id. ¶ 16, 442 P.3d at 55. 
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The court also performed an analysis under Rule 19 of the Wyoming Rules 
of Civil Procedure, which governs the joinder of indispensable parties and 
the determination of cases when an indispensable party is not able to be 
joined.54 Even though the court determined the BLM was not an 
indispensable party, it stated that even if the BLM was an indispensable 
party, pursuant to an analysis of the four factors in Rule 19(b) to determine 
if an action can proceed without an indispensable party the court determined 
that the Thornburg Lease dispute action could proceed.55 The court cited the 
fourth factor as the most significant – that if the action was dismissed for 
nonjoinder of the BLM, no adequate remedy or forum existed to address the 
Thornburg Lease dispute.56 
The second question for the court was whether the district court’s use of 
“the law of the case” doctrine was correct, so that the district court’s prior 
accommodation ruling in Berenergy I would be applied to the Thornburg 
Lease dispute in Berenergy II.57  
Since the district court stated it would have utilized the law of the case 
doctrine (typically defined as “a court’s decision on an issue of law made at 
one stage of a case becomes a binding precedent to be followed in successive 
stages of the same litigation”58) to apply its decision in Berenergy I to 
Berenergy II  if the BLM was joined as a party, review of that decision by 
the higher court is a two-part analysis.59 
First, the court reviewed the lower court’s holding for abuse of 
discretion.60 A court has “discretion to ‘entertain relitigation of settled issues 
when the failure to do so would work “a manifest injustice.”’”61 The court 
found that since the parties had ample opportunity to argue the Thornburg 
Lease dispute through extensive litigation, the district court’s decision not to 
relitigate certain issues (therefore apply the law of the case doctrine and 
utilize the district court’s Berenergy I accommodation holding) was not an 
abuse of discretion.62 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Id. ¶¶ 20–21, 442 P.3d at 57. 
 55. Id. ¶ 21, 442 P.3d at 57. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. ¶ 23, 442 P.3d at 57. 
 58. Id. ¶ 26, 442 P.3d at 58, citing Triton Coal Co. v. Husman, Inc., 846 P.2d 664, 667 
(Wyo. 1993) (citing 1B JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 0.404[1] (2d 
ed. 1983)). 
 59. Id. ¶ 24, 442 P.3d at 57–58. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 62. Id. ¶ 25, 442 P.3d at 58. 
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Second, the court reviewed de novo “whether the prior decision controls 
the issue raised in the subsequent proceeding.”63 The court found that 
normally a litigant’s failure to raise an issue on appeal gives preclusive effect 
to the lower court’s ruling, and in the case at hand the parties did not appeal 
the district court’s ruling as it pertained to the Thornburg Lease.64  
However, if an appealed judgment is not independent from the non-
appealed portion of the case, then the whole judgment is treated as appealed – 
which in this case would mean the Thornburg Lease dispute would be treated 
as appealed in the same way the federal lease dispute in Berenergy I was 
appealed.65 The court then distilled the issue down to whether the Thornburg 
Lease issues were independent (severable) from the federal lease issues that 
were appealed in Berenergy I, or on the other hand “the same as, or 
interdependent upon” the issues appealed in Berenergy I.66After examining 
the record, the court found that the Thornburg Lease issues were different 
and therefore severable, so that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Berenergy I (if 
the BLM could not be joined as a party, the case must be dismissed) only 
applied to the federal leases named in Berenergy I.67 
Therefore, the court found that the district court’s use of the law of the 
case doctrine was correct, and so it follows that the lower court’s ruling that 





                                                                                                                 
 63. Id. ¶ 24, 442 P.3d at 57–58 (internal citation omitted). 
 64. Id. ¶ 27, 442 P.3d at 58. 
 65. Id. ¶ 28, 442 P.3d at 58. 
 66. Id. ¶ 31, 442 P.3d at 59. 
 67. Id. ¶ 32–35, 442 P.3d at 59–60. 
 68. Id. ¶ 35, 442 P.3d at 60. 
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